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ABSTRACT A serious need to spur antibiotic innovation has arisen because
of the lack of antibiotics to combat certain conditions and the overuse of
other antibiotics leading to greater antibiotic resistance. In response to
this need, proposals have been made to Congress to fund antibiotic
research through a voucher program for new antibiotics, which would
delay generic entry for any drug, even potential blockbuster lifesaving
generics. We find this proposal to be inefficient, in part because of the
mismatch between the private value of the voucher and the public value
of the antibiotic innovation. However, vouchers have the political
advantage in the United States of being able to raise sufficient amounts
of money without annual appropriations from Congress. We propose that
if antibiotic vouchers are to be considered, the design should include
dollar and time caps to limit their volatility, sufficient advance notice to
protect generic manufacturers, and market-based linkages between the
value of the voucher and the value of the antibiotic innovation. We also
explore a second option: The federal government could auction vouchers
to the highest bidders and use the money to create an antibiotics
innovation fund.

B

acteria constantly evolve, especially in response to antibiotics used in
agriculture and medicine. Resistant bacteria already kill 23,000
people a year in the United States1
and more than 700,000 people worldwide, including 214,000 neonatal deaths each year from
sepsis.2 Absent dramatic changes, ten million
people could die annually by 2050 from resistant
bacteria, viruses, retroviruses, and parasites.3
Much of this resistance is driven by wasteful
overuse of antibiotics in inappropriate settings.4
In addition to this crisis of overuse, antibiotics
are tragically underused in many parts of the
world. Broader access to existing antibiotics
could save 445,000 children younger than age
five from death as a result of communityacquired pneumonia.2,4
784
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Many global stakeholders are mobilizing to
respond to these threats, including the World
Health Organization,5 the European Union,6
the United States,7 the Review on Antimicrobial
Resistance,3 the Group of Seven (G7) member
countries,8 and think tanks such as Chatham
House in London.9,10 These stakeholders have
made proposals that collectively call for a
three-prong approach to resistant bacteria:
access, to maximize the health impact of antibiotics, especially in low-income populations
currently suffering from inadequate access; conservation, which decreases the need for antibiotics through infection control, vaccination, and
antibiotic stewardship; and innovation, policies
supporting the development of powerful new
generations of antibiotics.11 While these approaches are valuable and necessary, one com-
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Antibiotic Vouchers
As the voucher scheme is currently envisioned,
high-quality antibiotic innovation will be rewarded with a transferable voucher, similar in
some respects to the existing Tropical Diseases
Priority Review Voucher Program,19 but with a
key difference. The priority review vouchers
speed up FDA review times by allowing a standard drug to be given priority review status, saving about four months.20 Antibiotic vouchers are
transferable like the priority review vouchers;
however, unlike the priority review vouchers,
they extend the market exclusivity period for
any other drug or biologic product by a year even
if it is not an antibiotic. While priority review
vouchers speed the market entry of a non–prior-

ity review drug, antibiotic vouchers delay generic
entry of a competing drug against whichever
drug the voucher holder desires to protect. For
example, the holder of an antibiotic voucher
could apply it to an oncology drug, delaying generic entry by an additional year. To allow manufacturers of generic drugs to plan, vouchers
should not be used during the final four years
of a drug’s patent protection before generic entry. Companies that receive the voucher would
also make binding commitments regarding antibiotic stewardship, which avoids wasteful misuse and unnecessary resistance. Some proposals
for these vouchers also call for donations to public entities such as the National Institutes of
Health or an antibiotic innovation fund.13
Earlier versions of this idea were called “wildcard” patents.15–18 At present, the mechanism is
not patent law but a regulatory provision that
delays generic entry of drugs. The concept is
known as regulatory exclusivity. Current examples of nontransferable regulatory exclusivities
include the seven years granted in the United
States to orphan drugs, the twelve years for biologics, and the six months granted to a drug
sponsor after conducting pediatric studies.21,22
Efficiency As a funding mechanism, antibiotic vouchers are not particularly efficient. In this
context, “less efficient” means higher future
drug prices, with less antibiotic innovation to
show for it. This is the case for several reasons.
▸ LENGTH OF EXCLUSIVITY PERIOD : First, the
efficiency of antibiotic vouchers depends greatly
on the length of the exclusivity period (Exhibit 1). Methods for calculating efficiency are available in the online Appendix.23 For example, if
vouchers are granted only for very high-quality
drugs,24 then a reasonable target is no more than
fifteen drugs per decade.3 From recent reviews of
antibiotic research and development costs, each
of these drugs will have required perhaps
$800 million in expenditures to bring it to market,3,15,24–26 with aggregate costs in the range of
$12 billion per decade for fifteen drugs. With
these costs in mind, how long should the exclusivity period be for each voucher? If based solely
on time (for example, twelve months), then a
voucher—which delays generic entry—that is applied to a drug with US sales exceeding $6 billion
will protect those sales dollars from generic competition after the patent expires. Consumers and
health plans (including Medicare, Medicaid, and
private plans) will pay more, since the voucher
will delay the significant reductions in price associated with generic entries, in the range of
80 percent or more.27,28 Therefore, the approximate nominal cost to the US health system of a
single twelve-month voucher in this example exceeds $4.8 billion (80 percent of $6 billion), with
May 2 016
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mon weakness they share is inadequate funding.
For example, in keeping with the recommendations of the US National Strategy on Combating
Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria, President Barack
Obama’s 2016 budget called for an additional
$1.2 billion, but as of mid-April 2016, Congress
had not yet acted.12 Political realities in the United States and across the world could dampen a
sufficient response.
In this environment, some US stakeholders
have recently proposed “antibiotic vouchers”
that could fund antibiotic innovation.13–15 These
would work as follows: A company developing an
innovative antibiotic could obtain from the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) a voucher that
could be sold (transferred) to another pharmaceutical firm for the purpose of extending that
firm’s patent exclusivity on an existing drug.
Most of the discussions about antibiotic vouchers have occurred in the US context, where this
idea enjoys the powerful lure of not requiring
annual appropriations from Congress. Through
what some might call a budget gimmick, antibiotic vouchers can achieve a zero budget impact
score from the Congressional Budget Office
(CBO), so long as higher drug prices from the
delayed entry of generic drugs do not occur during the ten-year CBO scoring window for assessing federal budget impact. The costs are shifted
to government programs such as Medicare and
Medicaid, private health plans, and other payers’
health budgets in future decades.
In our view, these proposals are unwise for the
efficiency and fairness reasons previously described in the literature16–18 and updated in this
article.We also raise additional criticisms, but in
an effort to be constructive, especially in light of
urgent funding needs, we suggest key modifications that ameliorate some of the worst features
of antibiotic vouchers, resulting in the “least
bad” version of the proposal.

785
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Exhibit 1
Cost estimates to US health system budgets for transferable antibiotic exclusivity vouchers
Research and
development
supporteda

Direct costs to
US health
budgets

Per antibiotic voucher
Per decadeb

$800 million
$12 billion

Three months
Per antibiotic voucher
Per decadeb

$800 million
$12 billion

Exclusivity period

Imputed interest rate
Efficiency

5 years

7 years

$4.8 billion
$72.0 billion

16.7%

43.1%

29.2%

$1.2 billion
$72.0 billion

66.7%

8.4%

5.9%

Twelve months

aggregate costs of $72 billion per decade for fifteen drugs. At a global level, a previous estimate
using 2005 sales data found that a single oneyear global voucher would cost health systems
and consumers up to $9.4 billion.16
This is an extraordinarily inefficient financing
mechanism even if only limited to the United
States, spending $4.8 billion in higher future
drug costs in exchange for each incremental
$800 million in antibiotic research and development. If this was structured as a loan from the
company to the government, the implicit interest rate would range from 29 percent to 43 percent per year. Shortening the exclusivity period
to three months would be much more efficient;
priced as a loan, the implicit interest rate falls to
6.0–8.5 percent.
▸ LINK BETWEEN VALUE AND REWARD : Second, the value of the reward should be proportional to the effort undertaken, but the link between value and reward is particularly tenuous
for antibiotic vouchers. Voucher values change
over time, introducing risk for the companies
and insurers. Value will vary based on the drugs
sold by the company holding the voucher. It
would be most valuable in the hands of the company with the biggest-selling drug nearing the
end of its patent exclusivity and therefore nearing the time of generic entry. It would be less
valuable for the company with the second-biggest-selling drug facing competition from generic entry. But values might also increase unexpectedly, perhaps in response to commercial
opportunities or successful patent litigation
against a branded drug that suddenly upset commercial expectations. So rewards will vary significantly over time, as we have seen with the value
of priority review vouchers, which are awarded
by the FDA but can be sold by the voucher holder
to the highest bidder. Priority review vouchers
have sold for increasing amounts. The first
786
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voucher sold for $67.5 million, but subsequent
sales prices rose to $125 million, $245 million,
and most recently $350 million.19 These significant increases in value should not be viewed as
evidence of success in incentivizing research and
development, since the rewards are not proportional to the research and development costs or
the value of the underlying innovation. Vouchers
also entail significant transaction costs when
sold, including paying the lawyers, brokers,
and consultants who facilitate a voucher sale.
▸ REWARDING HIGH - QUALITY INNOVATIONS :
Third, any system will have to be designed to
limit rewards only to appropriate high-quality
innovations. The first priority review voucher
was granted in 2009 to Novartis for a combination drug containing artemether and lumefantrine for treatment of malaria, despite already
being on the market in many countries outside
of the United States.19 This development has continued. Knight Therapeutics gained a tropical
disease priority review voucher in 2014 for miltefosine,19 despite the fact that it was already on
the market and being used to treat leishmaniasis
in many countries. By registering it in the United
States, Knight Therapeutics became eligible for
the voucher, which it then sold to Gilead Sciences for $125 million, even though the voucher was
not based on any new drug innovation.19 More
disturbingly, vouchers are awarded even if the
product is not actually registered for sale in lowincome countries or is priced too high for global
health needs. Any system needs to be robust
enough to ensure that drug companies are given
incentives to undertake more research and that
their research leads to greater innovation that
actually improves health, instead of receiving a
windfall for something they would have done
anyway. The recent history of the Generating
Antibiotic Incentives Now (GAIN) Act of 2012,
which extended by five years the exclusivity pe-
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SOURCE Authors’ estimates. NOTES Efficiency is the nominal ratio of research and development supported over direct costs to health
budgets. See the online Appendix for details on the calculation of imputed interest rates (see Note 23 in text). aSee Notes 3, 24–26 in
text. bSee Note 3 in text.

policy. Throughout the history of US intellectual
property law, exclusivity rewards have been tied
to the innovative product itself. A copyright is
awarded but only on the book authored. A patent
prohibits infringing use by others for twenty
years but only on the innovative product that
was the subject of the patent. Never before in
US intellectual property law has exclusivity protection been applied to an existing product because of an entirely unrelated innovation.
This historic step should give pause, for good
reason. While empirical literature increasingly
challenges the efficiency of the patent system
outside of drugs and chemicals,34 the iron-clad
link between innovation and reward is a key part
of the safety net protecting consumer welfare.
Many promising inventions never pan out in
practice, but if so, then the patent period was
not a drag on the economy because few people
bought the product. But antibiotic vouchers
grant exclusivity to one product (such as a cancer
drug) based on the registration of an entirely
different innovative product (an antibiotic).
Normally, the market for the innovation determines the value of the patent; here, an entirely
different product determines the value. Vouchers replace the market function of patent valuation with a system designed by Congress.
Partly because of the above concerns, antibiotic vouchers may face constitutional challenges in
the United States, since the Patent and Copyright
Clause links the innovation and the reward.
While the US Supreme Court has shown significant deference to congressional decisions to extend intellectual property protections,35 in this
case, the extension would be on an entirely different product. Alternatively, the voucher proposal might be grounded in the Commerce
Clause,36 but the US Supreme Court has not yet
ruled whether a law prohibited under the Patent
and Copyright Clause could be enacted under
other provisions of the Constitution, especially
given the recent moves by the Court to limit the
congressional power in the Affordable Care Act
litigation. Some Justices may find it difficult to
support an innovation incentive that would have
been anathema to the Founding Fathers. Generic
drug companies might also pursue a claim that
the government has taken property and must pay
just compensation under the Fifth Amendment,
arguing that their investment-based expectations were disrupted by the sudden application
of transferable market exclusivity.37 This issue
may be partially addressed by requiring four
years of prior notice before vouchers could be
activated to enable companies developing generic drugs to plan adequately for generic entry. But
advance notice of a taking generally does not
resolve the claim, which might require compenM ay 2 0 1 6
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riod during which antibiotics that treat serious
or life-threatening infections could be sold without generic competition, also raises similar concerns, as the standard for “qualifying infectious
disease product” was set so low that almost every
antibiotic qualifies.29 Any new proposal for antibiotic vouchers or other significant incentives
for innovation should set very high standards.24
▸ PRESERVING VOUCHERS FOR APPROPRIATE
CASES : Finally, while supporters may seek to use
antibiotic vouchers as a special case, other
groups and interests will rally to join the queue.
In the short history of the Tropical Disease Priority Review Voucher Program, Congress has
twice expanded access to the process, first for
rare pediatric diseases in 201230 and then, two
years later, for Ebola and related tropical diseases.31 A current bill proposes exclusivity vouchers for neonatal innovation.14 Given the immense
market value of delaying generic entry by one
year for a best-selling drug, other disease groups
can be expected to lobby Congress to grant similar vouchers for innovation suiting their needs
and interests. As more join, inefficiencies
mount, and the reward value diminishes. For
this system to work, proponents will need to
successfully demonstrate that antibiotics are
an exceptional—even unique—case that warrants particular treatment by government.
Fairness While not technically a patent, antibiotic vouchers would delay generic entry for
best-selling drugs after the patent has expired.
Consumers and health insurance payers will pay
higher prices in a system with antibiotic vouchers as a result of this delay; this is not a bug, but
an unavoidable design feature of the program.
Antibiotic innovation will be funded through
higher drug prices on other drugs in the future.
One can think of it as a tax on cancer or cardiovascular treatment to fund antibiotic innovation.16 If antibiotics are considered essential infrastructure for the health system, then perhaps
this is appropriate, but it also raises important
questions about fairness (and, in economic
terms, deadweight loss), including ensuring appropriate access to all drugs both in the United
States and abroad, where access to many therapies is already too limited.2,4,11,32 Delaying generic
entry of a best-selling drug will have real implications for patients and health systems. If these
rules are also imposed on other countries
through trade agreements, then these risks of
delayed access to needed therapies multiply in
lower-income populations. Any solution to antibiotic innovation should be designed to minimize potential global challenges to accessing
these drugs.33
Additional Concerns Antibiotic vouchers
sever the most important linkage in innovation
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Redesigning Antibiotic Vouchers
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Antibiotic vouchers are not a de novo policy idea;
rather, they represent a second-generation modification to earlier wildcard patent extension
proposals.13,15–18 Given the significant remaining
limitations detailed above, we now describe what
design elements third-generation proposals
should feature.
Our primary goal was to make the mechanism
more efficient. Two core insights drove the redesign effort: First, extending regulatory exclusivities was best understood as a financing mechanism for antibiotic innovation; second, most of
the inefficiencies arose from the gaps between
the efforts required to obtain a voucher and the
value of the voucher in the hands of the transferee. To put this another way, the core inefficiencies resulted from the lack of a link between the
value of the innovation and the value of the
voucher. We offer two alternatives: first, an incremental tailoring of the voucher concept; and
second, a more fundamental shift, with public
auctions of vouchers to fund antibiotic prizes.
Both recognize the financing aspect of vouchers
front and center, while restoring proportionality
between the value of the voucher and the underlying innovation. The results look somewhat
more like a prize than a patent.
Tailored Vouchers The first alternative is to
tailor the vouchers to the social value of the antibiotic innovation. The two essential features are
described below.
▸ VARY VOUCHER REWARD BY SOCIAL VALUE
OF ANTIBIOTIC INNOVATION : Not all antibiotics
are equally valuable. Another skin and skinstructure drug for Gram-positive bacteria is a
lower priority and should not receive any voucher-based reward.24 There has to be an agreed set
of antibiotic priorities that cover the most crucial
unmet human needs but that are not so broad
that the system pays for products of limited incremental value. The Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention has published a list of the most
urgent bacterial threats to the US population.1
New antibiotics targeting these urgent threats,
then, should receive vouchers with significant
market value. Researchers have outlined mechanisms for directing greater rewards to the most
significant antibiotic innovations, based on target product profiles.3,10,24,29,38 A key question is
how to make the market value of the vouchers
more proportional to the value of the antibiotic
innovation. This is addressed in the second essential feature described below.
▸ DESIGN VOUCHER REWARD BASED ON REV-

A voucher period of
twelve months, standing alone, is a blunt instrument. The tie between innovation and reward
would be much tighter if the voucher capped
the revenues that could be protected within
the twelve-month time period. So, for example,
the voucher would expire at the earlier of twelve
months or $1 billion in protected revenues,
whichever occurred first. This provides a clear
cap of the costs (protected revenues) of the
voucher, giving policy makers a much more precise understanding of the costs associated with
each voucher. Efficiency could be calculated by
comparing this with the antibiotic research and
development cost incurred to procure the voucher through public reporting of this data.
These two features should be combined, varying the dollar cap by the social value of the new
antibiotic. These values would be set in advance
for a specific target based on health needs. For
example, a novel oral antibiotic for drug-resistant gonorrhea might be awarded a voucher good
for up to $1.5 billion in protected revenues, while
an entirely novel class of drugs active against
Gram-negative bacteria such as carbapenemresistant Enterobacteriaceae—a family of germs
difficult to treat because of high levels of resistance to antibiotics—might receive a voucher for
as much as $3 billion.24
Capping revenues takes pressure off the decision about the length of voucher exclusivity and
opens the market for purchasing vouchers to
additional buyers, as the market is no longer
limited to the best-selling drugs. Dozens of drugs
have US annual sales exceeding $1 billion.
The rules must articulate clear criteria for any
particular voucher, and prospective changes to
the voucher should occur only to give investors
certainty. Since antibiotics are increasingly approved based on limited clinical data, vouchers
should also not be awarded immediately upon
FDA approval of the drug but at a later point
when safety and effectiveness can be confidently
and meaningfully assessed—in practical terms,
no sooner than about two to three years after a
drug reaches the market.3,24
In all cases, companies developing generic
drugs will need to have a clear idea of the latest
point at which generic entry might occur. Additional protections might need to be explored to
secure eventual generic entry. For example, if
vouchers awarded because of the new antibiotics
protect only $1 billion in sales of a drug benefiting from the delayed entry of a competing generic, then these sales figures would need to be
publicly reported in real time to allow timely
generic entry. The question will also arise as to
whether or not multiple vouchers could be activated on a single product.

ENUES AS WELL AS TIME :

Kevin Outterson is a partner in the
DRIVE-AB group, funded by the
Innovative Medicines Initiative, in the

Challenges For many governments with national social insurance systems, all voucher proposals discussed herein might look like nonsense: If all of the funds eventually come from
the health budget, it would be more efficient to
pay for antibiotic innovation directly. As a result,
one challenge, or limitation, of a voucher system
is the difficulty coordinating any US action with
other countries that may choose a different path,
including complexities relating to global agreements on intellectual property and trade.33,40
But if antibiotic vouchers are understood primarily as a national financing mechanism, then
it is possible for countries with significant private health care financing such as the United
States to adopt tailored or auctioned vouchers
to fund their share of antibiotic stewardship
and innovation, while other countries might use
general revenues or health budgets directly.33,40
Indeed, this could operate in the United States
solely as a national system but with the programs
linked to wider international action.
Finally, while these proposals do not make
potential constitutional issues worse, those
questions still remain unanswered.
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Auctioned Vouchers The second alternative
is a more fundamental reworking of the concept,
with the vouchers no longer awarded for bringing a novel high-quality antibiotic to market.
Instead, the government would directly auction
several twelve-month $1 billion vouchers each
year, putting the proceeds into an antibiotic innovation fund. The fund would be used to support antibiotic access, conservation, and innovation, including significant cash payments for
hitting research and development milestones,18
akin to the current practice at the US government’s Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority but including significant
payments after registration.24 For example, if
the government needed to raise $1.8 billion in
cash for the fund, it would sell perhaps $2 billion
in vouchers at public auction. The net proceeds
would then be used to reward antibiotic innovation and support antibiotic stewardship. Auctions would be a highly efficient financing mechanism, with clear gains in accountability as well.
If the antibiotic innovation fund was large
enough, full or partial antibiotic delinkage
mechanisms could result.10,29 Rewarding companies for selling large volumes of antibiotics is
inherently problematic because of drug resistance, leading the industry to recently call for
prizes or value-based delinked reimbursement
for antibiotics at the World Economic Forum
in Davos, Switzerland.39 Value-based delinkage
is when companies are paid based on value or
milestone not sales volume. Delinkage allows
antibiotics to be held in reserve and used entirely
on medical grounds, without commercial exigencies.3 Delinkage simultaneously addresses
problems with access, conservation, and
innovation—a major advance over current
policies.10,24,29,38,39

Conclusion
Policy makers should be aware of the inequities
and inefficiencies associated with antibiotic
voucher proposals. If vouchers are to be used,
they must be more carefully tailored by focusing
only on the highest-quality innovation and capping protected revenues over specified time periods. Even more directly, vouchers could be auctioned to the highest bidders, and the funds then
used to promote antibiotic access, conservation,
and innovation. Either alternative is a significant
improvement over current proposals. ▪
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